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We introduce a new class of quantum quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust
against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from
the BB84 only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against
PNS attacks at zero error.
Quantum cryptography, or more precisely quantum
key distribution (QKD) is the only physically secure
method for the distribution of a secret key between two
distant partners, Alice and Bob [1]. Its security comes
from the well-known fact that the measurement of an
unknown quantum state modifies the state itself: thus
an eavesdopper on the quantum channel, Eve, cannot
get information on the key without introducing errors in
the correlations between Alice and Bob. In equivalent
terms, QKD is secure because of the no-cloning theorem
of quantum mechanics: Eve cannot duplicate the signal
and forward a perfect copy to Bob.
In the last years, several long-distance implementa-
tions of QKD have been developed, that use photons
as information carriers and optical fibers as quantum
channels [1]. Most often, although not always [2], Al-
ice sends to Bob a weak laser pulse in which she has
encoded the bit. Each pulse is a priori in a coher-
ent state |√µeiθ〉 of weak intensity, typically µ ≈ 0.1
photons. However, since no reference phase is avail-
able outside Alice’s office, Bob and Eve have no infor-
mation on θ. Consequently, they see the mixed state
ρ =
∫
dθ
2pi |
√
µeiθ〉〈√µeiθ|. This state can be re-written as
a mixture of Fock states,
∑
n pn|n〉〈n|, with the number n
of photons distributed according to the Poissonian statis-
tics of mean µ, pn = pn(µ) = e
−µµn/n!. Because two
realizations of the same density matrix are indistinguish-
able, QKD with weak pulses can be re-interpreted as fol-
lows: Alice encodes her bit in one photon with frequency
p1, in two photons with frequency p2, and so on, and does
nothing with frequency p0. Thus, in weak pulses QKD,
a rather important fraction of the non-empty pulses ac-
tually contain more than one photon. For these pulses,
Eve is then no longer limited by the no-cloning theorem:
she can simply keep some of the photons while letting the
others go to Bob. Such an attack is called photon-number
splitting (PNS) attack. Although PNS attacks are far be-
yond today’s technology [3], if one includes them in the
security analysis, the consequences are dramatic [4,5].
In this Letter, we present new QKD protocols that
are secure against PNS attack up to significantly longer
distances, and that can thus lead to a secure implemen-
tation of QKD with weak pulses. These protocols are
better tailored than the ones studied before to exploit
the correlations that can be established using ρ. The ba-
sic idea is that Alice should encode each bit into a pair of
non-orthogonal states belonging to two or more suitable
sets.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we re-
view the PNS attack on the first and best-known QKD
protocol, the BB84 protocol [6], in order to understand
why this attack is really devastating when the bit is en-
coded into pairs of orthogonal states. Then we present
the benefits of using non-orthogonal states, mostly by fo-
cusing on a specific new protocol which is a simple mod-
ification of the BB84.
PNS attacks on the BB84 protocol. Alice encodes each
bit in a qubit, either as an eigenstate of σx (|+ x〉 coding
0 or | − x〉 coding 1) or as an eigenstate of σz (|+ z〉 cod-
ing 0 or | − z〉 coding 1). The qubit is sent to Bob, who
measures either σx or σz. Then comes a classical proce-
dure known as ”sifting” or ”basis-reconciliation”: Alice
communicates to Bob through a public classical chan-
nel the basis, x or z, in which she prepared each qubit.
When Bob has used the same basis for his measurement,
he knows that (in the absence of perturbations, and in
particular in the absence of Eve) he has got the correct
result. When Bob has used the wrong basis, the partners
simply discard that item.
Consider now the implementation of the BB84 proto-
col with weak pulses. Bob’s raw detection rate is the
probability that he detects a photon per pulse sent by
Alice. In the absence of Eve, this is given by
Rraw(δ) =
∑
n≥1
pn (1− (1− ηdetηδ)n) ≃ ηdetηδ µ , (1)
where ηdet is the quantum efficiency of the detector (typ-
ically 10% at telecom wavelengths), and ηδ is attenuation
due to the losses in the fiber of length ℓ:
ηδ = 10
−δ/10, δ = αℓ [dB] . (2)
Below, when we give a distance, we assume the typical
value α = 0.25 dB/km. The approximate equality in (1)
is valid if ηdetηδ pn n << 1 for all n, which is always the
case in weak pulses QKD.
If we endow Eve with unlimited technological power
within the laws of physics, the following PNS attack
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(storage attack) is in principle possible [4,5]: (I) Eve
counts the number of photons, using a photon-number
quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement; (II) she
blocks the single photon pulses, and for the multi-photon
pulses she stores one photon in a quantum memory;
she forwards the remaining photons to Bob using a per-
fectly transparent quantum channel, ηδ = 1 [7]; (III) she
waits until Alice and Bob publicly reveal the used bases
and correspondingly measures the photons stored in her
quantum memory: she has to discriminate between two
orthogonal states, and this can be done deterministically.
This way, Eve has obtained full information about Alice’s
bits, thence no processing can distill secret keys for the
legitimate users; moreover, Eve hasn’t introduced any
error on Bob’s side.
The unique constraint on PNS attack is that Eve’s
presence should not be noticed; in particular, Eve must
ensure that the rate of photons received by Bob (1) is not
modified [8]. Thus, the PNS attack can be performed on
all pulses only when the losses that Bob expects because
of the fiber are equal to those introduced by Eve’s storing
and blocking photons, that is, when the attenuation in
the fiber is larger than a critical value δBB84c defined by
Rraw(δ
BB84
c ) =
∑
n≥2
pn
(
1− (1− ηdet)n−1
) ≃ ηdet p2 . (3)
For µ = 0.1, we find δc
BB84 = 13 dB, that is ℓc
BB84 ≈
50 km. For shorter distances, Eve can optimize her at-
tack, but won’t be able to obtain full information; Alice
and Bob can therefore use a privacy amplification scheme
to retrieve a shorter secret key from their data. In con-
clusion, for δ ≥ δcBB84, the weak-pulses implementation
of the BB84 protocol becomes in principle insecure, even
for zero quantum-bit error rate (QBER).
Encoding in non-orthogonal states. The extreme weak-
ness of the BB84 protocol against PNS attacks is due to
the fact that whenever Eve can keep one photon, she gets
all the information, because after the sifting phase she
has to discriminate between two eigenstates of a known
Hermitian operator. Intuition suggests then that the ro-
bustness against PNS attacks can be increased by using
protocols that encode the classical bit into pairs of non-
orthogonal states, that cannot be discriminated deter-
ministically. We prove that this intuition is correct.
To fix the ideas, consider the following protocol using
four states: Alice encodes each bit in the state of a qubit,
belonging either to the set A = {|0a〉, |1a〉
}
or to the
set B = {|0b〉, |1b〉
}
, with |〈0a|1a〉| = |〈0b|1b〉| = χ 6= 0
(Fig. 1, left). In the absence of an eavesdropper, Bob
can be perfectly correlated with Alice: in fact, although
the two states are not orthogonal, one can construct a
generalized measurement that unambiguously discrimi-
nates between the two. The price to pay is that some-
times one gets an inconclusive result [9]. Such a mea-
surement can be realized by a selective filtering, that is a
filter whose effect is not the same on all states, followed
by a von Neumann measurement on the photons that
pass the filter [10]. In the example of Fig. 1, the filter
that discriminates between the elements of A is given by
FA = 1√1+χ
(|+ x〉〈1a⊥|+ | − x〉〈0a⊥|
)
, where |ψ⊥〉 is the
state orthogonal to |ψ〉. When the photons are prepared
in a state of the pair A, a fraction 1−χ of them pass this
filter, and in this case the von-Neumann measurement of
σx achieves the discrimination. It is then clear how the
cryptography protocol generalizes BB84: Bob randomly
applies on each qubit one of the two filters FA or FB, and
measures σx on the outcome. Later, Alice discloses for
each bit the set A or B: Alice and Bob discard all the
items in which Bob has chosen the wrong filter and all
the inconclusive results.
Of course, since not all the qubits will pass the filter
even when it was correctly chosen, there is a small nui-
sance on Bob’s side because the net key rate is decreased.
This is compensated by increasing µ by a factor 1/(1−χ).
However, the nuisance is by far bigger on Eve’s side, even
when the increased mean number of photons µ is taken
into account. We shall give a detailed analysis of the PNS
attacks below for a specific protocol, but a simple esti-
mate shows the origin of the improved robustness. Eve
can obtain full information only when (i) she can block
all the pulses containing one and two photons, and (ii) on
the pulses containing three or more photons, she performs
a suitable unambiguous discrimination measurement (see
below) and obtains a conclusive outcome, which happens
only with probability pok < 1. Consequently, the critical
attenuation is defined by Rraw(δc) ≃ ηdet p3( µ1−χ ) pok,
and is determined by p3 instead of p2 as in the BB84, see
(3). For typical values, δc−δBB84c ≈ 10 dB, which means
an improvement of some 40km in the distance [11].
A specific protocol. Here is an astonishingly simple
protocol using four non-orthogonal states. Alice sends
randomly one of the four states | ± x〉 or | ± z〉; Bob
measures either σx or σz . Thus, at the ”quantum” level,
the protocol is identical to BB84, and can be immedi-
ately implemented with the existing devices. However,
we modify the classical sifting procedure: instead of re-
vealing the basis, Alice announces publicly one of the
four pairs of non-orthogonal statesAω,ω′ =
{|ωx〉, |ω′z〉},
with ω, ω′ ∈ {+,−}, and with the convention that | ± x〉
code for 0 and | ± z〉 code for 1. Within each set, the
overlap of the two states is χ = 1√
2
. Because of the pe-
culiar choice of states, the usual procedure of choosing
randomly between σx or σz turns out to implement the
most effective unambiguous discrimination. For definite-
ness, suppose that for a given qubit Alice has sent |+ x〉,
and that she has announced the set A+,+. If Bob has
measured σx, which happens with probability
1
2
, he has
certainly got the result +1; but since this result is possi-
ble for both states in the set A+,+, he has to discard it.
If Bob has measured σz and got +1, again he cannot dis-
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criminate. But if he has measured σz and got −1, then he
knows that Alice has sent |+ x〉 and adds a 0 to his key.
By symmetry, we see that after this sifting procedure Bob
is left with 1
4
of the raw list of bits, compared to the 1
2
of
the original BB84 protocol. Thus, for a fair comparison
with BB84 using µ = 0.1, we shall take here µ = 0.2, so
that the net key rates without eavesdropper at a given
distance are the same for both protocols. In spite of the
fact that a larger µ is used (that is, multi-photon pulses
are more frequent), this new protocol is provably better
than BB84 against PNS attacks at QBER= 0. This is
our main claim, and is demonstrated in the following.
PNS attacks at QBER=0. First, let us prove some-
thing that we mentioned above, namely: for protocols
using four states like the one under study, Eve can ob-
tain full information from three-photon pulses by using
strategies based on unambiguous state-discrimination.
Such strategies have also been considered for BB84, be-
cause (although worse than the storage attack for an
all-powerful Eve) they don’t require a quantum memory
[12], and in their simplest implementation the photon-
number QND measurement is not required either [13].
The most powerful of these attacks, against which any
protocol using four states becomes completely insecure
for the three-photon pulses, goes as follows [14]. A pulse
containing three photons is necessarily in one of the four
states |Ψ1〉 = |+ z〉⊗3, |Ψ2〉 = |+ x〉⊗3, |Ψ3〉 = | − z〉⊗3,
|Ψ4〉 = | − x〉⊗3; that is, in the symmetric subspace of 3
qubits. The dimension of this subspace is 4, and it can
be shown that all the |Ψk〉⊗3 are linearly independent
[15]. Therefore, there exist a measurement M that dis-
tinguishes unambiguously among them, with some prob-
ability of success. In the present case, there exist even
four orthogonal states of three qubits, |Φk〉, k = 1, ..., 4,
such that |〈Φi|Ψj〉| = 1√
2
δij [16]. The measurementM is
then any von-Neumann measurement discriminating the
|Φk〉; it will give a conclusive outcome with probability
pok =
1
2
, which is optimal [15,17].
It is then clear that Eve can obtain full information
if she can block all the one- and two-photons pulses and
half of the three-photon pulses, by applying the follow-
ing PNS attack: (I) she measures the number of photons;
(II) she discards all pulses containing less than 3 photons;
(III) on the pulses containing at least 3 photons, she per-
forms M, and if the result is conclusive (which happens
with probability pok >∼ 12 ) she sends a new photon pre-
pared in the good state to Bob. We refer to this attack
as to intercept-resend with unambiguous discrimination
(IRUD) attack. Neither the quantum memory is needed,
nor is the lossless channel, since the new state can be
prepared by a friend of Eve located close to Bob.
The critical attenuation δc at which the IRUD attack
becomes always possible is defined by ηδcµ = pokp3(µ);
for µ = 0.2, this gives δc = 25.6 dB ≈ 2δBB84c . Thus, the
ultimate limit of robustness (in the case of zero errors) is
shifted from ∼ 50km up to ∼ 100km by using our simple
modification of the BB84 protocol. To further increase
the limit of 100km, one can move to protocols using six
or more non-orthogonal states [17].
Figure 2 plots Eve’s information for the best PNS at-
tack at QBER= 0, as a function of the attenuation. Note
that the new protocol is better than BB84 at any dis-
tance. For almost all δ < δc, the best PNS attack is not
the IRUD but a storage attack, in which Eve keeps one
or two photons in a quantum memory and waits for the
announcements of the sifting phase. Recall that in BB84,
this kind of attack provides Eve with full information. In
our protocol Alice announces sets of two non-orthogonal
states, so storage attacks give Eve only a limited amount
of information. If Eve keeps n photons and the overlap
is χ (here, 1/
√
2), the largest information she can obtain
is I(n, χ) = 1 −H(P, 1 − P ) with P = 1
2
(1 +
√
1− χ2n)
[9]. In particular, Eve obtains I(1, 1√
2
) ≈ 0.4 bits/pulse
for the attenuation δ1 at which she can always keep one
photon (δ1 ≃ 11 dB for µ = 0.2).
In conclusion: in the limiting case of QBER= 0, our
protocol is always more secure than BB84 against PNS
attacks, and can be made provably secure against such
attacks in regions where BB84 is already provably inse-
cure. Recall that the comparison is made by fixing the
net key rates without eavesdropper at a given distance.
Attacks at QBER>0 on the new protocol. In real ex-
periments, dark counts in the detectors and misaligne-
ment of optical elements always introduce some errors.
It is then important to show that the specific protocol
we presented does not break down if a small amount of
error on Bob’s side is allowed. Several attacks at non-
zero QBER are described in detail in Ref. [17]. Here, we
sketch the analysis of two individual attacks.
First, let us suppose that Eve uses the phase-covariant
cloning machine that is the optimal individual attack
against BB84 [18]. In the case of the present proto-
col, Eve can extract less information from her clones,
again because Alice does not disclose a basis but a set
of non-orthogonal states. As a consequence, the condi-
tion IBob = IEve is fulfilled up to QBER=15% [17], a
value which is slightly higher than the 14,67% obtained
for BB84. So our new protocol, designed to avoid PNS
attacks in a weak-pulses implementation, seems to be
robust also against individual eavesdropping in a single-
photon implementation. Incidentally note that, in the
case of a single-photon implementation, our protocol is
at least as secure as the B92 protocol in the sens of ”un-
conditional security” proofs [19]. This is because our pro-
tocol can be seen as a modified B92, where Alice chooses
randomly between four sets of non-orthogonal states [20].
The second kind of individual attacks that we like
to discuss, and that we call PNS+cloning attacks, are
specific to imperfect sources. Focus on the range δ ≃
10 − 20 dB (see Fig. 2), where one-photon pulses can
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be blocked and the occurrence of three or more photons
is still comparatively rare. Because for the BB84 Eve
has already full information in this range, such attacks
have never been considered before. Eve could take the
two photons, apply an asymmetric 2 → 3 cloning ma-
chine and send one of the clones to Bob; she keeps two
clones and some information in the machine. By a suit-
able choice of the cloning machine, the QBER at which
IBob = IEve is lowered down to ∼ 9% [17]. In Ref. [21], a
successful qubit distribution over 67km with µ = 0.2 and
QBER= 5% has been reported. Under the considered
PNS attacks, such distribution is provably insecure using
the sifting procedure of BB84, while it can yield a secret
key if our sifting procedure is used.
In summary, we have shown that by encoding a clas-
sical bit in sets of non-orthogonal qubit states, quan-
tum cryptography can be made significantly more robust
against photon-number splitting attacks. We have pre-
sented a specific protocol, which is identical to the BB84
protocol for all the manipulations at the quantum level
and differs only in the classical sifting procedure. Un-
der the studied attacks, our protocol is secure in a region
where BB84 is provably insecure. Preliminary studies of
more complex attacks suggest that it is at least as ro-
bust as BB84 in any situation, and could then replace
it. Moreover, our encoding can easily be combined with
more complex procedures on the quantum level, e.g. [22].
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FIG. 1. Two pairs of non-orthogonal states on the equator
of the Poincare´ sphere, and the effect of the filter FA.
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FIG. 2. PNS attacks with QBER=0 on the BB84 proto-
col for µ = 0.1 and on the new protocol for µ = 0.2: Eve’s
information as a function of the attenuation δ = αℓ.
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